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Назва: Логіко-філософські основи застосування права: автореферат
Інші назви: Logical and philosophical foundations of the application of law: thesis
Автори: Мартинишин, Г.Й.
Martynyshyn, H.Y.
Ключові слова: логічні основи застосування права
філософські основи застосування права
метафізична (позитивістська), прагматична (реалістична) та постметафізична (процесуальна) парадигми застосування права
юридичний силогізм
істинність судового рішення
logical foundations of the application of law
philosophical foundations of the application of law
metaphysical (positivist), pragmatic (realistic) and post-metaphysical (procedural) paradigms of the application of law
legal reasoning
truth of the judgment
Дата публікації: 2017
Видавництво: ЛьвДУВС
Короткий огляд (реферат): У дисертації розкрито логіко-філософські основи застосування права. Під логічними основами застосування права слід розуміти закони та правила мислення, котрі дають змогу виводити правильні висновки з певної сукупності вихідних даних про фактичні обставини справи та змісту норм і принципів права. Під філософськими основами застосування права слід розуміти гранично загальні, світоглядні аксіоматичні ідеї, що визначають розуміння, принципи та мету застосування права. У роботі розкрито три основні парадигми застосування права: метафізичну (позитивістську), прагматичну (реалістичну) та постметафізичну (процесуальну). Обґрунтовано зв’язок між кожною із цих парадигм та мовами формалізації юридичних силогізмів. Висвітлено проблеми істинності правозастосовного рішення з позицій різних сучасних логіко-семантичних теорій істини.Thesis unveils philosophical and logical underpinnings of the application of law. The author begins with general concept of law application provided by the Ukrainian legal doctrine and proceeds with showing its origins – these are dogmas of dialectical materialism and the theory of reflection. The author demonstrates that actually the whole mechanism of legal regulation – and law application as its essential element – is a subject to the general purpose that is materializing the logic of social and first of all economic relations. The weakness of this approach is being analyzed. The issue of the application of law was always conceived in Ukrainian literature as a part of a more general concept of law realization – process of bringing law to life. Application of law was however regarded as a very special form of law realization. Soviet legal doctrine set the priority of legal norm in regard to application of law, stressing that law can never be created by a judgment. The process of application of law runs by stages. The first stage is the establishment of facts. Not all the facts matter, but only those which are important. Importance of the fact is designated by a norm. The second stage is often called legal qualification. Here the law enforcer considers how the norm regulates a certain case. The first appreciation of the case may be false and that is why it must be clarified and specified. Finally, the third stage contains resolution of the case, embodied in a formal legal act – an act of law application. Besides, every stage is subject to truth: first, legal norm must correctly reflect the civil relations; second, all the important facts must be investigated and proved correctly (that means statement of the facts must reflect the fact). Third, a suitable norm must be interpreted correctly to reflect the true meaning of the text. Finally, the cohesion of fact and norm must get along together. The mechanism of legal regulation accomplishes its aim if and only if all the four premises are valid in the case: the norm correctly (truthfully) reflects current economic relations, the fact are established beyond any doubt, the norm is correctly (truthfully) interpreted i.e. according to the real intent of the framers and finally, the judge succeeds in applying a true norm to a true fact. Of only one of these elements is not fulfilled, the adjudication of a matter is false. A shared feature for all the stages of the application of law is that something must be reflected correctly, i.e. economy in legislator’s intent, the letter in the norm. Law enforcer makes his path in the opposite direction, moving from the text to the final point – economic relations which are reflected in the legislator’s intent. This all resembles the process of pulling a nest-doll up and down. Basic objection to this theory is that law cannot be reduced to economic relations. First, this position breaks down with any moral foundation to law, giving, actually, no foundation to it unless we regard interests of ruling class as a good reason to obey the law. Second, even if we admitted the letter premise, we would still be unable to justify the statement that economic relations may be reflected correctly in one and only true way. Third, as law is often applied to changing social conditions, it is almost impossible to get the desired cohesion of true law with a true fact. This is most obviously seen with regard to application of law in the context of social change. Given that legal positivism does not provide reasonable explanation of the application of law, the author explores other theories that are pragmatic and procedural. The first one reasonably admits that application of law cannot neglect judge’s personal experience but nevertheless overestimates the latter and underestimates logical statements. But procedural theory provides the best explanation of how judges adjudicate and rule. Author demonstrates the formalization of legal reasoning in four languages of logic: classical, first order predicate, deontic and defeasible. The first three are regarded as logics of legal positivism as the formulate reasoning exclusively in closed logical systems. But given the fact that under common opinion law nowadays cannot be reduced to norms, this three logic fail to explain how judges adjudicate in situations when they should weigh conflicting arguments to find the best solution. That is why author admits that rule of law entails a form of legal reasoning that is incompatible with closed monotonic logics. Finally the author analyzes the problem of truth in the judgments and demonstrates that all the opinion that one can find in the literature are based on the so called correspondent theory of truth. This theory is unsophisticated and cannot be defended in the light of current logical knowledge. The author argues that only deflationary theory may give a reasonable explanation of truth in the judgment.
Опис: Мартинишин Г. Й. Логіко-філософські основи застосування права: автореферат дисертації на здобуття наукового ступеня кандидата юридичних наук за спеціальністю 12.00.12 – філософія права/ Мартинишин Галина Йосипівна. –Львів: ЛьвДУВС, 2017. - 21 с.
URI (Уніфікований ідентифікатор ресурсу): http://dspace.lvduvs.edu.ua/handle/1234567890/662
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