Прагматичне світосприймання у правовому вимірі

Abstract

Розглянуто регулятивну функцію прагматизму як методології правознавства та юридичної діяльності. Проаналізовано вчення основоположників прагматизму, зроблено спробу розкрити процедуру набуття їхніх теоретичних положень статусу методології загалом і правової сфери зокрема. Досліджено інструменталізм Дж. Дьюї як специфічну логіку та методологію пізнання права шляхом поетапного вирішення правознавчих проблем. Викладено застереження щодо претензії прагматизму на найбільш загальну методологію пізнання та діяльності, абсолютизації суб’єктивістських висновків і підходів. The article deals with the determinant regulatory function of pragmatism as a methodology of jurisprudence and legal activity. An analysis of the doctrine of the founders of pragmatism was made; an attempt to reveal the procedure for obtaining their theoretical positions of the status of the methodology in general and the legal sphere in particular was performed. The authors consider that the pragmatic approach is meaningful in jurisprudence in that part of it, when it comes to evaluation criteria of effectiveness, success, practical expediency of certain legislative acts or specific norms. But this criterion of truth as success is variable and cannot be considered in the status required, naturally determined, since it is always relative. The peculiarity of the research is that it is almost for the first time considered J. Dewey’s instrumentalism as a specific logic and methodology of cognition of the law through a step-by-step solution of social problems. Noting the gap between the «fantastic success» definite sciences and morals lag, decline of human values, he sees a way out in establishing a more optimal balance between the achievements of science and human values, which can be realized through the function of human thinking, «intelligence», to which he assigns the role of the main instrument of cognition and actions. Pragmatism as a methodology is a kind of modern, final chord in the game which the modern world philosophy has taken for in search of practical direction. In this context, legal pragmatism took its place as a purely practical way out of the modern understanding of law as a social phenomenon, aimed at solving the most pressing, existential problems of a man. At the same time, one cannot fail to see in this ideological paradigm the excessive subjectivity and a somewhat purely utilitarian orientation. Therefore, the authors presented certain comments on the claims of pragmatism on the most common methodology of cognition and activity, the absolutisation of subjectivist conclusions and approaches